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Christian theologians have analyzed the productive and destructive 
qualities of institutions, sometimes attributing to them human virtues and 
vices. In City of God, Saint Augustine describes a utopian vision of human 
community within a Christian context as an alternative to the flawed “City 
of Man.”1 Contemporary theologians and sociologists have described 
collective structures of human behavior in institutions as having a kind of 
“spirit” analogous to the individual human “spirit.”2 Institutions are then 
assumed to take on an existence separate from the individuals within them, 
and in fact, the “spirit” of an institution influences the behavior of 
individuals. In The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution, Adolf A. Berle Jr. 
considers the tradition of religious utopianism and whether corporate 
capitalism has a spiritual character that impacts communities and 
individuals for good or ill and whether this might have implications for 
corporate managers.3 
This Article provides a contemporary theoretical framework for 
Berle’s insight as a basis for considering its legal and ethical implications 
 
 1. SAINT AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO, THE CITY OF GOD 426, reprinted in GREAT BOOKS OF THE 
WESTERN WORLD: VOLUME 18 AUGUSTINE (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952). 
 2. See, e.g., WALTER WINK, THE POWERS THAT BE: THEOLOGY FOR A NEW MILLENIUM 3–4 
(1999). See generally David Cloutier, Why Talk About “Structures of Sin”?, PUB. DISCOURSE (Jan. 
28, 2019), https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2019/01/48918/ [https://perma.cc/9HEG-5PDK]. 
 3. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 164–88 (1954). 
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for corporate governance. Part II attempts to unpack contemporary 
understandings of spirit in order to provide a helpful working definition. 
Part III considers the origins and essential traits of the modern business 
corporation in the United States. The question posed by Berle—whether 
corporations can or ought to have a sort of moral orientation—is discussed 
in Part IV, while Part V ponders potential policy shifts that might tilt the 
orientation of the “spirit of the corporation” toward the common good. Part 
VI considers the limits of legal reform and the role of individuals and 
subgroups in changing corporate paradigms. 
I. SPIRIT 
Defining a notion as ephemeral as “spirit” outside of specific 
philosophical or theological contexts presents a variety of challenges in 
scholarly discourse. This Section attempts to provide a basis for 
considering spirit in more generalizable terms. It begins with common 
usage and understanding of the term, and Then moves to sociological and 
broadly inclusive theological constructions of the term. 
A. Common Understandings of Spirit 
What are the meanings of “spirit,” particularly in ways that do not 
refer directly to the supernatural? In colloquial American English, “spirit” 
is used in a variety of contexts. It is used in compound nouns such as the 
following: school spirit, patriotic spirit, public spirit, civic spirit, team 
spirit, Christmas spirit, aloha spirit, pioneer spirit, or kindred spirit. There 
are varieties of spirits such as good, evil, free, or independent. Times and 
places are said to have a spirit (e.g., Spirit of 76, spirit of the age, spirit of 
the west, Spirit of St. Louis). Distilled beverages may be called spirits, as 
may solvents. There are phrases of encouragement, such as “that’s the 
spirit.” Something may be done “in the spirit” of something else. There is 
even an airline called Spirit. Perhaps most significantly for legal 
scholarship, there is the traditional distinction between the letter and the 
spirit of the law.4 This is not an exhaustive list, but it does highlight some 
commonalities. Spirit may be understood as the essence of a thing as 
distinguished from its physical form or description.5 The first definition of 
spirit in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary is “an animating or vital 
principle held to give life to physical organisms.”6 
 
 4. E.g., Richard Anthony, The Letter of the Law vs. The Spirit of the Law, DEVOTED TO TRUTH, 
http://66.165.89.51/truth/letter.html [https://perma.cc/T6XH-RPZB]. 
 5. See RONALD RADHOFF, EVOLVING LIFE AND TRANSITION TO THE WORLD BEYOND: THE 
FANTASTIC JOURNEY OF THE BODY, MIND AND SPIRIT 130–31 (2011). 
 6. Spirit, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/spirit [https:// 
perma.cc/CY6K-PAUD]. 
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Spirit has very specific and nuanced meanings within religion and 
belief systems. Although significant differences exist, there is a common 
Judeo-Christian-Islamic etymology and understanding of spirit in at least 
some contexts. In the scriptural traditions of the Hebrew Bible, the New 
Testament, and the Quran, the word usually translated into English as 
“spirit” is originally a word for breath.7 Ruach (רוח) in Hebrew is a cognate 
with rūḥ (روح) in Arabic. Pneuma (πνεύμα) is a Greek word for breath in 
the New Testament texts as well as the Septuagint translation of the 
Hebrew Bible. It is typically translated as spiritus in Latin translations like 
the Vulgate. The English “spirit” derives from the Latin. 
Although the contemporary, non-religious understanding of  
spirit-as-essence may apply in the scriptural contexts of Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam, there are also theological and supernatural 
meanings. In all three traditions, there is a term, translated as “Holy Spirit” 
in English, using the related word for breath noted above. Holy Spirit is 
identified with or related to deity. There is also a commonly held  
notion that human beings have a spirit, which in some traditions exists 
separately from the body and may transcend death.8 All three traditions 
contain some reference to what might be considered evil spirits.9 Thus, in 
these religious traditions, a spirit as the essence of a being may have a 
particular orientation toward or away from the deity, which might be 
understood as a moral orientation. The popular understanding of angels 
and demons contrasts angels as essentially good spiritual beings, while 
demons are angels who rebelled against God, thus changing their 
orientation toward evil. This is typically (though not exclusively) 
portrayed within Christian contexts.10 
In the popular conception, humans exist between the good and evil 
spirits being encouraged or tempted by each respectively—in a sense the 
tabula rasa. The trope of an angel sitting on one’s shoulder exhorting good 
behavior and a devil on the other shoulder egging on bad behavior 
reinforces this sense of original human innocence and neutrality (an 
admittedly dramatic oversimplification of the theological traditions). This 
trope is nearly ubiquitous in cartoons ranging from Donald Duck11 to 
 
 7. What Does the Hebrew Word “Ruach” Mean?, COMPELLING TRUTH, https://www.compelling 
truth.org/meaning-ruach.html [https://perma.cc/4EJE-2RDD]. 
 8. KJERSTI LARSEN, WHERE HUMANS AND SPIRITS MEET: THE POLITICS OF RITUALS AND 
IDENTIFIED SPIRITS IN ZANZIBAR 46 (2008). 
 9. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all have a “Satan” in their texts and have traditions of 
demonology (although those traditions may have developed later or be marginal, particularly in the 
case of Judaism). 
 10. Popularized portrayals of angels and/or demons are found in movies like It’s a Wonderful 
Life, The Exorcist, The Omen, and Heaven Can Wait, or in television series such as Highway to 
Heaven, Touched by an Angel, and Supernatural. 
 11. DONALD’S BETTER SELF (Walt Disney Productions 1938). 
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Homer Simpson.12 In this portrayal, the human being is understood to have 
freedom to choose either good or evil. That choice then reflects the essence 
or spirit of the person. 
B. Sociology and Spirit 
Social scientists have considered constructions of religion and the 
idea of spirit for more than a hundred years.13 Although these approaches 
come from a variety of perspectives, they seriously consider the religious 
as something “real”—this implies there are identifiable patterns in 
spiritual systems. 
1. From the Individual to the Polis 
In The Idea of the Holy, Rudolf Otto develops a vocabulary to define 
the aesthetic dimensions of religion.14 He describes human engagement 
with the “numinous” (related to spirit if not the explicitly spiritual), which 
is wholly other, indescribable, terrifying, fascinating, and characterized by 
dread and awe.15 He refers to the mysterium tremendum, which indicates 
a sense of awe or uncanny.16 This need not necessarily imply a turn to the 
supernatural.17 Otto begins with the individual’s response to the numinous, 
whether in the form of the divine, the spirit, or the transcendent.18 
Mircea Eliade’s work is comparative and historical in that it 
considers the wide breadth of human spiritual experience.19 His model of 
archetypes seems concrete and prosaic; however, unlike much religious 
studies scholarship, he engages the mythological and the divine as 
legitimate subjects, rather than assuming a veneer of scientific quality.20 
In other words, Eliade, unlike some of his colleagues, seriously considers 
the role of spirit in the development of religion. He also explores the 
relationship between spirit and other social phenomena (economics in 
particular).21 In Eliade’s view, mythological and divine archetypes act as 
ideal Platonic forms that religious practices are modeled upon.22  
 
 12. The Simpsons: Whacking Day (Fox Network television broadcast Apr. 29, 1993). 
 13. See, e.g., GRACE DAVIE, THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 26 (2007). 
 14. RUDOLF OTTO, THE IDEA OF THE HOLY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE NON-RATIONAL FACTOR IN 
THE IDEA OF THE DIVINE AND ITS RELATION TO THE RATIONAL (John W. Harvey trans., Oxford Univ. 
Press 2d ed. 1958). 
 15. See id. at 5–7. 
 16. Id. at 12–13. 
 17. Id. at 12–14. 
 18. See id. at 6. 
 19. See MIRCEA ELIADE, THE MYTH OF THE ETERNAL RETURN: COSMOS AND HISTORY (Willard 
R. Trask trans., Princeton Univ. Press 2d ed. 2005). 
 20. See, e.g., id. at 34–48. 
 21. Id. at 159–62, 159 n.15. 
 22. Id. at 9–10. 
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In this sense, spirit is real. In terms of social theory, Eliade shows little 
regard for politics per se, but he does argue that archetypes determine, and 
in some sense are determined by, specific forms of human social 
organization.23 He thus rejects the study of religions solely from 
psychological or sociological perspectives and seeks to examine 
individual patterns or forms of spiritual expression on their own terms.24 
He also importantly makes a spiritual connection between the individual 
and social structures.25 
2. Spirit and the Social 
William Newman asserts that “regardless of what else may be said 
of religion, it is also a social phenomenon—it is something that people do 
in groups.”26 This move toward social and scientific understanding 
characterizes most contemporary religious studies and sociology of 
religion scholarship. For example, Emile Durkheim assumes that religion 
is a definable and appropriate subject of scientific inquiry.27  
For Durkheim, religion is characterized by totemism: symbols 
representing and creating community (whether in the context of totem 
animals, symbols, or even flags).28 He thus understands religion in a social 
context (“God is society writ large”).29 In this view, religion is constructed 
by society, and its expressions have a number of common forms—e.g., a 
division of the world into sacred and profane; a belief in souls and the 
spiritual world; and a faith in some form of divinity, asceticism, or 
rites/liturgy. The identification of these forms allowed Durkheim to 
identify commonalities across religious traditions to generalize about 
“religion.” In addition to characterizing religion as “the social,” Durkheim 
makes a connection between religion and religious community: “A 
religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred 
things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices 
which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those 
who adhere to them.”30 This is arguably the most influential approach to 
understanding religion in the social sciences. Thus, spirit for Durkheim 
would be understood in a social context, distinguished by patterns, rules, 
norms, and other elements we might identify as culture. 
 
 23. See id. at 9–11. 
 24. See, e.g., id. at xxvii–xxix. 
 25. Id. at 47. 
 26. WILLIAM NEWMAN, THE SOCIAL MEANINGS OF RELIGION: AN INTEGRATED ANTHOLOGY 3 
(1974). 
 27. ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE (1912). 
 28. Id. at 205–08. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 46. 
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Berger provides a description of the dialectical role of religion in 
mediating between society and individuals.31 This dialectic may be 
understood as creating an essence or spirit distinct from the group of 
individuals or the institutional structures that support and limit such a 
group. He identifies three steps in this process: externalization, 
objectivation, and internalization.32 Externalization is the physical and 
mental outpouring of human beings into the world.33 Objectivation is the 
phenomenon of these outpourings coalescing around and confronting the 
original producers (in his terms as a “facticity”).34 Internalization is the 
reception of this reality by human beings, transforming the “structures of 
the objective world into structures of the subjective consciousness.”35 This 
process creates a meaningful order that, when well established, may be 
described as religion, or “the human enterprise by which a sacred cosmos 
is established.”36 Religion reinforces the power of internalization by 
legitimating social institutions as sacred.37 However, there continues to be 
a reciprocal relationship beyond legitimation, as individuals continue to 
impact objectivation through their ongoing externalization.38 I am 
reasonably comfortable with this description as a way of understanding 
the mediating role of the spiritual, even if it is not entirely comprehensive. 
James Wellman’s definition of religion as the social enactment of a 
desire for the ultimate, usually related to a spirit or god, spirits or gods39 
relates to Durkheim’s understanding of religion as the social and seems to 
incorporate something like Berger’s understanding of its formation in the 
“enactment.” However, it also appears to synthesize elements of the 
psychological and the theological. The role of “desire,” for example, 
acknowledges a fundamental psychological need for order and explanation 
as a defense, presumably against anxiety. Looking to the “ultimate” and a 
relationship with the “infinite” evokes a sense of the numinous and makes 
space for metaphysical and theological understandings of religion. This 
synthesis may provide a more satisfying description of religion even if it 
creates some degree of ambiguity by considering the numinous. 
 
 31. See PETER BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY: ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF 
RELIGION 25–28 (1990). 
 32. Id. at 4. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 26. 
 37. See id. at 32–39. 
 38. See id. at 10–20. 
 39. See generally James K. Wellman, Jr., Is War Normal for American Evangelical Religion?, 
in BELIEF AND BLOODSHED: RELIGION AND VIOLENCE ACROSS TIME AND TRADITION 195 (James K. 
Wellman, Jr. ed., 2007). 
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Also in the tradition of Durkheim, Clifford Geertz provides a helpful 
definition in the context of social science: 
[A] religion is: (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish 
powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in 
men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence 
and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality 
that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.40 
That aura might be analogous to essence or spirit. 
3. Spirit and the Political 
A number of scholars engage with the relationship between spirit and 
politics in order to consider the overlap and influences between the two. I 
will discuss Ernest Renan, Robert Bellah, and Slavoj Zizek. 
Philosopher Ernest Renan is best known for his political theories and 
influential historical works on early Christianity. In What is a Nation?, 
Renan describes the nation as “a soul, a spiritual principle,” which might 
be considered analogous to spirit, with two distinguishing characteristics: 
a common legacy of memories and present consent by its members.41 In 
this sense, he acknowledges the dialectic between individuals and groups 
identified by the sociological approaches described earlier. He argues that 
nations are constructed on the basis of cultural, rather than biological, 
affinity.42 He notes the phenomenon of conquerors adopting the religion 
of the conquered as seemingly counterintuitive.43 He identifies the national 
with the spiritual,44 perhaps as an antecedent to Durkheim’s understanding 
of the religious as the social. However, it is possible that his thesis 
anticipates the development of civil religion or a secular spirituality. In 
fact, it may be that the need for both a common legacy of memories and 
present consent in societies of diverse groups requires the creation of some 
sort of communally acceptable worldview, which might best be described 
as “religious,” and may take on its own essence. In other words, for Renan, 
the nation must either draw upon a common tradition or find overlap 
among a plurality of traditions to create something new. 
 
 40. Clifford Geertz, Religion as a Cultural System, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE: 
SELECTED ESSAYS 90 (1993). 
 41. Ernest Renan, What Is a Nation?, in NATION AND NARRATION 19 (Martin Thom trans., Homi 
K. Bhabha ed., 1990) (translating a lecture Ernest Renan delivered at a conference at the Sorbonne on 
March 11, 1882). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See id. Note however that this is perhaps a gross generalization. In the case of the early spread 
of Islam, it was generally the reverse. However, in periods of occupation, it was fairly common for 
invaders to adopt Islam (as in the case of Turkic tribes and the Mongols). 
 44. Id. 
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Robert Bellah is a sociologist best known for his work related to 
“American civil religion.”45 He argues that Americans embrace a common 
civil religion with certain fundamental beliefs, values, holidays, and rituals 
parallel to, or independent of, their chosen religion.46 Bellah identifies 
three critical stages of civil religious tradition in the United States.  
The first stage is established by the leaders of the revolution, and it is 
closely identified with the experience of the Hebrews flight from Egypt to 
the promised land.47 The second stage occurs at the time of the  
American Civil War and establishes President Lincoln as a civil Christ 
figure who sacrifices himself for the community.48 The third stage is 
characterized by America’s wrestling with its political, economic, and 
military dominance in the world.49 This seems to raise the sort of questions 
that faced the Davidic Kingdom of Israel or the early Christians who 
sought the reign of God.50 
Once the third stage is established, a new question emerges: how is 
power to be righteously exercised by the faithful? This stage is analogous 
to the Roman Empire after Christianity became the official faith. The 
mélange of American civil religion incorporates elements of major 
religious traditions—including elements of Protestantism, Catholicism, 
and Judaism, in particular—as well as various patriotic symbols used to 
connect people from other traditions not noticeably represented. However, 
“faith” in such a religion is likely to be tenuous in nature, because the new 
conglomeration of symbols and traditions maintains a religious character 
but also invites secular themes as the public image of religion is stripped 
of clear identifications with any particular tradition (other than through 
general references to God, which invoke ideas of monotheism). Even so, 
civil religion has created a sense of the numinous in its symbols (flags, 
mottos, ceremonial dress, military cemeteries, monolithic architecture and 
sculpture, etc.) and “liturgies” (such as pledges, anthems, inaugurations, 
memorial services, etc.). 
The critical theorist, Slavoj Zizek, famously critiques liberal 
democracies in his essay, “The Clash of Civilizations at the End of 
History,” wherein he examines the film Children of Men as an allegory for 
 
 45. Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, 96 DAEDALUS J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 1, 1 
(1967). 
 46. Id. at 5. 
 47. Id. at 6–8. 
 48. Id. at 9–11. 
 49. Id. at 12–16. 
 50. Brian Collins, Land, the Kingdom of God, and the Davidic Covenant, EXEGESIS & 
THEOLOGY (Apr. 8, 2017), https://exegesisandtheology.com/2017/04/08/land-the-kingdom-of-god-
and-the-davidic-covenant/ [https://perma.cc/NX96-E8AV]. 
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the modern world.51 Ironically, the film is set in a dystopian future.52 The 
film describes a world in which human beings are no longer able to 
reproduce.53 The privileged have fallen into profound self-indulgence and 
have imposed an oppressive political and military order to protect their 
power.54 Refugees and marginalized religious groups are held in camps 
that are beset by violence—but it is only these groups that maintain spirit, 
drive, and desire.55 Zizek compares the privileged in the film to liberal 
democracies, in which people have become passionless consumers living 
in fear of terrorism, consuming fat, and smoking tobacco.56 It is the poor, 
the oppressed, and those who refuse to be colonized who preserve the 
human spirit.57 It is not surprising then that, in the film, it is among the 
outcasts that the miracle child is born. Through this allegory, Zizek 
critiques the ostensible neutrality, objectivity, and fairness of liberal 
democracies, including their view of secularism.58 In a sense, wealthy, 
liberal society represents the distortion of spirit as contrasted with the 
virtuous spirit of the marginalized in Zizek’s view.59 
In the context of exploring politics, then, spirit may be (1) the essence 
of political identity, (2) an idea to be adapted by the political in order to 
provide social cohesion, (3) a force shaped by politics, or (4) a source of 
identity and inspiration that must be free of political control.  
C. Theology of Spirit 
There are a number of theologies of spirit (or pneumatology).60 
However, Walter Wink provides a narrative that fits within several of the 
sociological views described above and may be particularly helpful in 
considering spirit within human institutions, such as the corporation.61 He 
refers to the broader spiritual forces in the world as “powers.”62 This is a 
reference to the New Testament passage, Ephesians 6:12, which states: 
“[W]e wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, 
against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against 
 
 51. See Slavoj Zizek, The Clash of Civilizations at the End of History (2007) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with Seattle University Law Review). 
 52. CHILDREN OF MEN (Strike Entertainment 2006). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Zizek, supra note 51. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See, e.g., VELI-MATTI KARKKAINEN, PNEUMATOLOGY: THE HOLY SPIRIT IN ECUMENICAL, 
INTERNATIONAL, AND CONTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVE (2002). 
 61. See WINK, supra note 2. 
 62. See id. at 13–36. 
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spiritual wickedness in high places.”63 This passage has been understood 
as describing a hierarchy of spiritual forces or beings (demonic in this case 
but with corresponding angelic forces).64 Wink explains: 
Religious tradition has often treated the Powers as angelic or 
demonic beings fluttering in the sky. Behind the gross literalism 
of that way of thinking; however, is the clear perception that 
spiritual forces impinge on and determine our lives . . . . My first 
real breakthrough in understanding these invisible powers came 
when I stumbled over the angels of the churches in the New 
Testament Book of Revelation. Why, I wondered are each of the 
seven letters in chapters two and three addressed, not to the 
congregation, as in the apostle Paul’s letters, but to the 
congregation’s angel? The congregation was not addressed 
directly but through the angel. The angel seemed to be the 
corporate personality of the church, its ethos or spirit or essence. 
Looking back over my own experience of churches, I realized that 
each did indeed have a unique personality. Furthermore, that 
personality was real. It wasn’t what we call a “personification” 
like Uncle Sam or the Quaker on the box of oats. But it didn’t 
seem to be a distinct spiritual entity with an independent existence 
either. The angel of a church was apparently the spirituality of a 
particular church. You can sense the “angel” when you worship at 
a church. But you also encounter the angel in a church’s 
committee meetings and even in its architecture. People self-select 
into a certain congregation because they feel that this angel is 
compatible with their values. Hence the spirit of a church can 
remain fairly constant over decades, even centuries, though all the 
original members have long since departed.65 
The first example of spirit attributed to social structures is the faith 
community: the Church in Ephesus or the Church in Corinth. The 
communities take on an existence that is dependent on the individual 
members but also exists on its own. 
I searched for other data in ancient religious writing that might 
shed light on these corporate angels. The tenth chapter of Daniel 
in the Hebrew Scriptures extended my understanding to 
encompass the angels of entire nations, who represented their 
nation in the heavenly “court.” Cities, too, had angels, as did 
individuals. In other Jewish and Christian sources I discovered 
ancient sages who believed that everything in creation has its own 
 
 63. Ephesians 6:12 (King James). 
 64. Eric Covington, Power and the “Powers” in Thomas Aquinas’ Lectura ad Ephesios, 5 J. 
BIBLICAL & THEOLOGICAL STUD. 40, 57 (2020). 
 65. WINK, supra note 2. 
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angel. That meant, I concluded, that everything has both a physical 
and a spiritual aspect. The Powers That Be are not, then, simply 
people and their institutions, as I had first thought; they also 
include the spirituality at the core of those institutions and 
structures. If we want to change those systems, we will have to 
address not only their outer forms but their inner spirit as well.66 
The spirit of a community or institution is not merely the aggregation 
of structures that construct it. It develops its own essence, so reform cannot 
rest entirely on reforming those structures. 
I found the implications of that ancient view staggering. It means 
that every business, corporation, school, denomination, 
bureaucracy, sports team—indeed, social reality in all its forms—
is a combination of both visible and invisible, outer and inner, 
physical and spiritual. Right at the heart of the most materialist 
institutions in society we find spirit. IBM and General Motors 
each have a unique spirituality . . . .67 
If corporations have something we might identify as spirit, there are 
undoubtedly common traits shared by corporations, as well as 
idiosyncratic differences created by particular industries, regions, and 
business philosophies. 
As we have already suggested, however, the spirituality that we 
encounter in institutions is not always benign. It is just as likely to 
be pathological. And this is where the biblical understanding of 
the Powers surpasses in profundity the best of modern sociology. 
For the angel of an institution is not just the sum total of all that 
an institution is (which sociology is competent to describe); it is 
also the bearer of that institution’s divine vocation (which 
sociology is not able to discern). Corporations and governments 
are “creatures” whose sole purpose is to serve the general welfare. 
And when they refuse to do so, their spirituality becomes diseased. 
They become “demonic.”68 
Unlike Berle, Wink has no question that corporations exist to serve 
the common good. He further observes that failure to serve that end is a 
distortion of the ideal spirituality of a corporation. 
I had never been able to take demons seriously. The idea that 
fallen angels possessed people seemed superstitious. But if the 
demonic is the spirituality produced when the angel of an 
institution turns its back on its divine vocation, then I could not 
 
 66. Id. at 4. 
 67. Id. at 4–5. 
 68. Id. at 5. 
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only believe in the demonic, I could point to its presence in 
everyday life. And if the demonic arises when an angel deviates 
from its calling, then social change does not depend on casting out 
the demon, but recalling its angel to its divine task.69 
If this understanding has validity, then legal reform is unlikely to be 
successful in fundamentally reorienting institutions toward the common 
good unless they address the essence of an institution created by the 
dialectic between human subjects and framing institutions. 
Although Wink was a Methodist theologian, his understanding of 
human institutions is arguably consistent with the Catholic  
notion of “structural sin”—individual human sin that collectively  
shapes human institutions, allowing them to perpetuate sinful patterns of 
behavior and injustice.70 
II. CORPORATION 
Defining the modern business corporation in the United States 
context is not nearly as complex as defining “spirit.” However, there are a 
number of nuances. Corporate law, including formation, is governed by 
state law, so there is generally tremendous diversity across states. 
However, there are a number of common traits, some of which are the 
result of federal law (both case and statutory). Today, all U.S. corporations 
are legal persons as defined by federal precedent, which includes the right 
to property, to contract, to sue, to be sued, speech rights, procedural rights, 
and religious freedoms, among others.71 All corporations are presumed to 
have limited liability72 (which may technically be waived, but I have never 
seen it done). Ownership of a corporation is almost always evidenced by 
stock.73 Corporate stock may be traded on public exchanges if the 
appropriate registration requirements are met.74 Corporations are governed 
by directors, who may also be owners, managers, or both, but they need 
 
 69. Id. at 5–6. 
 70. See José Ignacio González Faus, Sin, in MYSTERIUM LIBERATIONIS: FUNDAMENTAL 
CONCEPTS OF LIBERATION THEOLOGY 536–39 (Ignacio Ellacuría & Jon Sobrino eds., 1993) 
(providing a description of structural sin). 
 71. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
 72. See, e.g., Ron Harris, A New Understanding of the History of Limited Liability: An Invitation 
for Theoretical Reframing, 16 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 643 (2020). 
 73. See DEBORAH E. BOUCHOUX, FUNDAMENTALS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS FOR 
PARALEGALS 421 (2017). 
 74. Exchange Act Reporting and Registration, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 24, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/goingpublic/exchangeactreporting [https://perma.cc/LM9M-
XSHB]. 
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not be.75 Founders must properly file a charter or articles of incorporation 
with the state. Corporations have no definite lifetime, making them 
effectively immortal so long as they are solvent. 
Corporations may be small or large, and they may have one or many 
owners. Most U.S. corporations are closely held, which means their shares 
are not traded on a public market.76 However, some of those closely held 
corporations are extremely large.77 Large, publicly traded corporations are 
often placed in a separate category from smaller corporations. There is a 
rich body of literature arguing that such corporations, which typically have 
a majority of outside directors and professional managers, have incentives 
very different from small corporations.78 
One major difference between large corporations and small 
corporations is their tax treatment. Tax treatment may differ depending on 
size and election—with smaller businesses often choosing treatment as an 
“S corp” to receive pass-through treatment by the IRS, similar to the 
traditional tax treatment of partnerships.79 In contrast, larger corporations 
are treated as “C corps” and are subject to taxation themselves at the entity 
level in addition to taxes owed by owners for realization events such as the 
sale of stock or the distribution of dividends.80 Some businesses, 
particularly smaller ones, are organized as limited liability companies 
(LLCs), which became popular in the 1990s once they were allowed to 
presume pass-through tax treatment.81 The legal framework for LLCs is 
 
 75. Powers & Duties of Corporation Directors & Officers, WOLTERS KLUWER (Apr. 24, 2019), 
https://ct.wolterskluwer.com/resource-center/articles/powers-and-duties-of-corporate-directors-
officers [https://perma.cc/C89M-RENT]. 
 76. Jean Murray, What Is a Closely Held Corporation?, THE BALANCE SMALL BUS. (Apr. 8, 
2020), https://www.thebalancesmb.com/what-is-a-closely-held-corporation-398187 [https://perma.cc 
/NQ4C-RMCK]. 
 77. Cargill is a “$115 billion-in-sales agricultural giant that has topped Forbes’ list of America’s 
largest private companies for 28 of the past 30 years.” Chloe Sorvino, Silent Giant: America’s Biggest 
Private Company Reveals Its Plan to Get Even Bigger, FORBES (Oct. 22, 2018), 
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“such as refining, chemicals and biofuels; forest and consumer products; fertilizers; polymers and 
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FORBES (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/companies/koch-industries/#47b7bd6874ce 
[https://perma.cc/PZ99-U7UJ]. 
 78. See BERLE, supra note 3; Blair & Stout, infra note 100; Bainbridge, infra notes 104–05. 
 79. S Corporations, IRS (July 31, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-
employed/s-corporations [https://perma.cc/GM43-R6RQ]. 
 80. Forming a Corporation, IRS (July 31, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-
businesses-self-employed/forming-a-corporation [https://perma.cc/8T9K-9JP2]. 
 81. See Limited Liability Company (LLC), IRS (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/ 
small-businesses-self-employed/limited-liability-company-llc [https://perma.cc/H4HN-6X5K]. 
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arguably more idiosyncratic than that of corporations, but they share many 
core traits (e.g., limited liability, personhood, etc.).82 
Large, publicly traded corporations have important distinctions from 
smaller corporations. As noted earlier, business entities vary widely in 
terms of size and scope. What does a small, family-owned farm or 
restaurant (whether organized as an LLC or as a corporation) share in 
common with a large public company? First, they share the main default 
attributes noted above. Second, and perhaps more importantly, they are 
formed in order to produce profits. Some economists argue that the 
modern business corporation has been the most effective human institution 
for mobilizing capital and growing economies.83 
III. CORPORATE FORM FOR “GOOD” OR “ILL” 
When teaching corporate law over the past twenty years, I begin  
the class with a thought experiment asking students to describe a 
corporation. The description typically begins with certain common 
structural similarities such as limited liability or stock as the indicia of 
ownership. At some point, we discuss the notion of corporate 
“personhood,” along with its legal and philosophical implications. If a 
corporation is a person, its characteristics, including rights and obligations, 
are worth considering.84 
On the second day of class, I typically show select scenes from the 
documentary, “The Corporation.”85 The film has a particular point of view, 
and I ask students to observe critically. The film raises a similar question 
regarding the essence of a corporation. In interviews, the filmmakers ask 
random subjects on the street or in a mall if McDonalds, the Body Shop, 
Disney, or Monsanto are persons, then “what sort of persons are they?”86 
Most responses anthropomorphize corporations using familiar human 
qualities, such as young, energetic, goofy, deceptive, or immaculately 
dressed.87 Such descriptors may reflect a characteristic of products or 
corporate managers, but the film attempts to identify common traits and 
focuses on the assumed regulatory imperative to maximize shareholder 
 
Depending on the terms agreed upon by LLC members, the IRS will treat an LLC as a corporation, 
partnership, or part of the LLC’s owner’s tax return. 
 82. LLC vs S Corp vs C Corp: Choosing the Best Entity Structure for Your Business, WOLTERS 
KLUWER, https://ct.wolterskluwer.com/resource-center/articles/choosing-business-types-llc-vs-s-
corp-vs-c-corp [https://perma.cc/CE6Q-WKVD]. 
 83. See, e.g., Timur Kuran, The Absence of the Corporation in Islamic Law: Origins and 
Persistence, 53 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 785, 810–11 (2005). 
 84. See, e.g., KENT GREENFIELD, CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO (AND THEY SHOULD ACT 
LIKE IT) (2018). 
 85. THE CORPORATION (Zeitgeist Films 2003). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
386 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 44:371 
wealth, presumably at the expense of all other competing values.88 The 
characterization of corporations as externalizing machines with 
similarities to sharks, whales, and monsters is exaggerated, but the attempt 
to describe how the essence of corporations is shaped by the regulatory 
and legal framework surrounding them is intriguing and may justify 
serious consideration of the essence or spirit of the modern corporation. 
As corporate law scholars, my peers and I tend to focus on the 
importance of legal rules in constraining the behavior of business entities. 
However, at least some of those structures are likely psychological, 
sociological, or both. Although the following examples are admittedly 
anecdotal, they demonstrate a clear exception to the priority of legal rules 
in shaping the essence of the corporation. 
I regularly have the opportunity to interact with members of the 
business law bar nationally and locally. These attorneys tend to be very 
successful, often elite-educated, with extensive transactional and litigation 
experience. In panels and discussions that address corporate fiduciary 
duties, I consistently ask what core duty is owed by a director to the 
corporation. The practicing attorney’s answer I nearly always receive is 
“to maximize shareholder wealth.” It is true that this is a presumably 
bright-line standard that has come to serve as a shorthand for the duty 
described by statute (the MBCA being the most common). It was 
popularized by the 1919 landmark case Dodge v. Ford Motor Company in 
the Michigan Supreme Court, and the principle is raised in legal opinions 
across jurisdictions.89 However, the language of nearly all state statutes 
follows the principles of the MBCA: 
8.30(a) Each member of the board of directors, when discharging 
the duties of a director, shall act: (1) in good faith, and (2) in a 
manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests 
of the corporation.90 
Thus, the core of the duty is to act honestly in the “best interests of 
the corporation.” Courts may interpret this as meaning that directors are 
required to prioritize shareholder wealth maximization (a standard that has 
itself been problematized),91 but it is not the analytical starting place. A 
typical hypothetical would consider the actions of a board that takes 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 90. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (2002). 
 91. See, e.g., Joan M. Heminway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of Statutes, 
Decisional Law, and Organic Documents, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 939, 970 (2017); Fred Matera, 
With the Proper Time Horizon, the Interests of Shareholders and Stakeholders Should Be Aligned, 
LINKEDIN (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/proper-time-horizon-interests-
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massive risks to increase short-term share price but ultimately weakening 
or potentially bankrupting the corporation. Day traders and hedge fund 
managers may profit handsomely, while long-term holders such as pension 
or mutual funds ultimately suffer losses. The “best interests of the 
corporation” statutory standard arguably provides a more principled basis 
for evaluating such director decisions. If wealth maximization is 
understood to consider a wide variety of shareholders and stock holding 
periods, it loses its effectiveness as a bright-line rule. So, the assumption 
of the primacy of shareholder wealth maximization may owe more to the 
education, psychology, and group dynamics of corporate lawyers than to 
the law, particularly statutory rules. 
The second example is the assumed influence of Delaware corporate 
law, particularly its case law. Courts in many jurisdictions rely on 
Delaware corporate case law in resolving complex issues.92 Virtually 
every foundational business entity, business organization, and corporate 
law class in North America focuses, at least in part, on a survey of 
Delaware corporate law. There are economic and historic explanations for 
this phenomenon, and it may serve as a helpful gap-filler for states without 
clear precedent. Like many in corporate practice, most of my clients in 
California, D.C., and New York were Delaware corporations. When I 
moved to the state of Washington, an MBCA jurisdiction, I was very 
surprised when a prominent corporate litigator explained to me that some 
rules for derivative suits in Washington relied on Delaware case law rules 
even when they were in apparent tension with the local statute. Even if this 
assertion does not actually constitute a trumping of local law, it illuminates 
the nearly universal influence of and bias toward Delaware law. Again, 
this may indicate a psychological or social dynamic, distinct from law, or 
perhaps even economics, in shaping corporate behavior and essence. 
Reimagining corporate fiduciary duties to consider employees, 
communities, the environment, and other potential stakeholders  
is certainly not the only, or necessarily the best, approach to orienting  
the essence of corporations toward the common or greater good. It is  
one example among many urging investors, managers, and regulators  
to a higher standard. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE 
If institutional structures such as cities, nations, or corporations have 
an identifiable spirit, can the institutions that shape that spirit, such as law, 
 
 92. See About Delaware’s General Corporation Law, DELAWARE.GOV, https://corplaw. 
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influence those structures toward the “good”? First, it is imperative to give 
meaning to moral categories such as good. 
Although moral and religious traditions have a wide variety of 
definitions for good and evil that may not be generalizable outside of 
particular communities, let us accept for the purposes of argument that 
most traditions value some conception of justice, which is often 
understood as the balancing of the common good with individual human 
dignity and flourishing. For example, the principal values reflected in 
Catholic social thought are the dignity of the human person and the 
common good.93 Inherent in this duality is potential tension when the 
rights and dignity of the individual conflict with what is for the greater 
good of the group. This example is analogous to the framework I use in 
pedagogy to evaluate the policy implications of particular legal rules.  
It is not a perfect analogy, but the approach creates some common 
vocabulary for critique. 
One of the predominant measures of traditional corporate 
governance, efficiency, considers the net gain or loss of resources. There 
is a rich literature of utilitarianism and law and economics with tools for 
evaluating efficiency (maximizing wealth in a particular community or 
system) as well as established norms for cost-benefit analysis in the 
implementation of regulations.94 
However, the good of efficiency may be in tension with the common 
good, to the extent that it does not consider distributional concerns (often 
construed as fairness). “Pareto-optimality” is one approach to addressing 
distributional concerns and considers a system optimal if there are no 
policy changes that can increase utility (resources available) without 
harming someone.95 A “Pareto superior move” is one that increases utility 
without causing harm to anyone.96 This is only one approach to 
distributional concerns, but I assert that all, or nearly all, moral or 
evaluative frameworks for policy address some distributional concerns. 
They may arise in the context of concern regarding market failures rather 
than concern for identifiable inequitable outcomes.97 
 
 93. An Introduction to the Principles of Catholic Social Thought, CTR. FOR SOC. CONCERNS, 
https://socialconcerns.nd.edu/content/introduction-principles-catholic-social-thought 
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 94. E.g., Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 
103 (1979). 
 95. See Charles K. Rowley, Wealth Maximization in Normative Law and Economics: A Social 
Choice Analysis, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 971, 982 (1998) (discussing Pareto’s influence on modern 
economic theory). 
 96. See id. at 985. 
 97. Note some shifts from neoclassical economics to welfare and behavioral economics. 
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Traditional notions of justice often rooted in Platonic thought 
consider justice as the balance of other virtues.98 If we accept that two core 
virtues of human institutions are flourishing (measured as efficiency) and 
the common good (measured as distributional fairness), then justice  
as a virtue requires balancing the two. A corporate spirit encouraging  
or tolerating fraud, exploiting employees, or destroying the environment 
may justify legal and regulatory intervention designed to create 
institutional frameworks that promote or at least incentivize sustained 
legal profits, expanding employment, living wages, and responsible 
stewardship of resources. 
If the spirit of a corporation is formed in part by the institutions that 
support and constrain them (such as law), then legal change may result in 
a change in the essence of a corporation beyond isolated behaviors. From 
a sociological perspective, if the spirit is the result of the dialectic between 
behavior (motivated by underlying belief) of managers and owners and the 
institutional frameworks that incentivize them, then adjusting those 
incentives may change the essence of a corporation.99 Berle considered the 
importance of a spiritual turn in the corporation; specifically, whether legal 
rules, owners, and managers ultimately have a role in promoting the “good 
life” which may perhaps be understood as the “common good.”100 One 
concrete step toward this shift could be the adoption of stakeholder and 
related models of corporate governance advocating that corporate 
fiduciaries consider the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders 
in making business decisions.101 
 
 98. Bibi Afifeh Hamedi Dashti, The Concept of Justice in Greek Philosophy (Plato and 
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I use the term “stakeholder theory” very broadly so as to include the 
stakeholder movement of the late 1980s, the team production model, 
corporate social responsibility and some foreign corporate governance 
regimes such as codetermination in Germany and the de facto system in 
Japan.102 All of these models challenge the shareholder primacy standard 
and allow or require boards to consider the interests of employees and 
other groups with a stake in the enterprise. 
A. Shareholder Exclusivity 
The contractarian model of the corporation proposed by many legal 
scholars is sometimes linked to shareholder wealth maximization and the 
shareholder103 (or in some cases the director104) primacy model.105 It may 
be categorized as a shareholder exclusivity model. The first part of the 
model is not terribly controversial—the separation of ownership and 
management; shareholders, as the owners of the firm, elect directors who 
hire professional managers to run the day-to-day operations of the 
corporation.106 The separation of ownership and control in public 
companies is said to be acceptable to shareholders because directors  
and managers owe shareholders, and no other parties, the fiduciary duties 
of loyalty and care (which is related to the second part of the  
model—the exclusive obligation to maximize shareholder wealth).107 
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Shareholder exclusivity argues that if other parties are owed duties, 
investors will be less willing to part with capital because profits might be 
diverted to others.108 The typical hypothetical for illustrating this tension 
is a plant closing: 
Managers could increase the value of the corporation’s shares if 
an unproductive plant were closed; at the same time, such a 
closing would displace workers and disrupt the community in 
which the corporation is situated. Under the shareholder primacy 
norm, managers must close the plant to fulfill their duty to 
shareholders, despite the harm to workers and other 
nonshareholder communities that such a closure would 
engender.109 
The iconic case for shareholder exclusivity is the Michigan Supreme 
Court’s 1919 decision in Dodge v. Ford, noted earlier.110 Henry Ford 
stopped paying extraordinary dividends in 1916 in order to raise wages, 
lower prices, and expand production facilities.111 The Dodge brothers 
brought suit to force distribution of an extraordinary dividend.112 
According to the court, if Ford had justified his business decisions as being 
in the best interest of the shareholders, his decisions would have stood.113 
However, because Ford admitted on the stand that he intended to benefit 
employees and customers rather than shareholders directly, his actions 
were cast as eleemosynary and inappropriate.114 In reality, there were a 
number of other competitive, reputational, and tax issues that likely 
influenced both the decision to withhold dividends and the character of 
Ford’s testimony.115 Even so, corporate law textbooks typically note this 
case as stating the rule of shareholder primacy: Directors and managers 
have a duty to maximize returns for shareholders alone and may not 
consider other interests.116 As noted earlier, this is not the rule in  
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most states.117 One might wonder then why this case is used to introduce 
or frame discussions of corporate fiduciary duties and the business 
judgment rule. 
The contractarian model is powerful in both its descriptive and 
predictive capacities from a certain point of view. However, shareholder 
exclusivity in particular presumes a significant level of development  
(e.g., reasonably efficient markets and sophisticated infrastructures) and 
stability (e.g., reliable means of legal enforcement for contracts and 
fiduciary duties). Major fraud and business failures over the past  
twenty years have demonstrated the difficulty of holding managers 
accountable to shareholders even with sophisticated corporate laws and 
securities regulations.118 
We see the interconnectedness of corporations, labor, governments, 
communities, banks, and other parties in states attempting to promote 
democratic and market institutions. In Iraq, Afghanistan, and Russia, it 
becomes clear that the ability of passive investors to earn returns on equity 
investments depends on the level of development and stability of local 
communities.119 To that extent, passive investors might be willing to 
transfer rents to the state, employees, creditors, and others who are able to 
create a climate that makes positive passive investment returns possible. 
Viewing this situation exclusively from the point of view of investors in 
sophisticated markets, like the U.S., discounts the role of other economic 
actors who make passive investment reasonably secure. Infrastructure 
degradation, environmental harm, labor unrest, social unrest, consumer 
fear, and other factors outside of the control of shareholders or managers 
could conspire to erode the underlying development and stability that 
make complex capital markets successful. Lest critics dismiss this view as 
naïve, note that successful economies such as those in Sweden, Germany, 
the United Kingdom, and Japan all acknowledge a more substantial role 
for employees in corporate governance than is allowed by shareholder 
exclusivity or most U.S. jurisdictions.120 
 
 117. See Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False 
Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 92–95 (1999). 
 118. See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron’s Collapse: The Overview; 
Enron Collapses as Suitor Cancels Plans for Merger, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2001), https://www.ny 
times.com/2001/11/29/business/enron-s-collapse-the-overview-enron-collapses-as-suitor-cancels-
plans-for-merger.html [https://perma.cc/FQN8-PL2B]. 
 119. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why 
Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn’t the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1067–68 (2004); 
Samina Sabir, Anum Rafique & Kamran Abbas, Institutions and FDI: Evidence from Developed and 
Developing Countries, 5 FIN. INNOVATION 8 (2019). 
 120. See, e.g., O’Connor, Labor’s Role in the American Corporate Governance Structure, supra 
note 101. 
2021] Spirit of the Corporation 393 
B. Stakeholder Theories 
The approaches previously lumped together as stakeholder theories 
have roots in early scholarship incorporating a communitarian ethic into 
analysis of corporate decision-making.121 These arguments have 
resurfaced periodically in various forms. Corporate social responsibility 
scholarship in the 1970s advocated a stricter regulatory response.122 
“Stakeholder theory” in the late 1980s came in vogue as managers sought 
ways to frustrate hostile takeovers.123 According to the shareholder 
exclusivity model, directors and managers should not prevent these 
transactions if they are in the best interest of the shareholders.124 However, 
when takeovers result in officer layoffs, manager interests almost certainly 
conflict with shareholder interests.125 Late 1980s stakeholder theory 
provided managers with a justification for considering interests other than 
those of shareholders, particularly in the takeover context.126 This 
particular manifestation was not necessarily progressive, but it did result 
in legal reform that could establish a basis for more progressive change.127 
The weak form of basic stakeholder theory is that managers and 
directors ought to be allowed to consider interests other than shareholder 
wealth maximization.128 This is the rule in most states today.129 The strong 
form of basic stakeholder theory requires that directors and managers 
consider the interests of competing stakeholders.130 This necessitates a 
clear definition of whose interests must be considered and in what context. 
The only state that adopted this rule was Connecticut, although it was 
amended to be made permissive in 2010.131 
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A more coherent and rigorous expression of this view is advocated 
by Professors Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, who have proposed the so-
called Team Production Model.132 Managers, shareholders, employees, 
creditors and local communities act as a team.133 Directors act as 
independent mediators and apportion rents to the various participants.134 
This approach acknowledges the interdependence of the participants and 
proposes to be more efficient in the allocation of returns.135 
Contemporary corporate social responsibility scholarship attempts to 
quantify social costs more broadly by considering environmental and 
political concerns as well as the interests of traditional stakeholders.136 
This body of work incorporates a number of critical lenses for evaluating 
corporate theory and practice, including critical race theory, feminist 
jurisprudence, and environmentalism.137 The advantage of this approach is 
that it is holistic, but the breadth of scope makes evaluating competing 
interests a challenging task. 
Considering the interests of groups other than shareholders is not 
merely theoretical. A number of countries require that boards address the 
concerns of employees. The German Aktiengesellschaft, or AG,138 uses a 
structure of “codetermination.”139 Essentially, this guarantees that 
employees either directly or through labor organizations have board 
representation.140 In very large AG’s such as Siemens, shareholders elect 
half of the supervisory board (a corporate board of directors equivalent).141 
Employees and unions elect the remaining half.142 Directors have an 
obligation to their electoral constituencies that avoids complicated 
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competing fiduciary duties.143 This sort of major structural change would 
be difficult in American corporations without some compensation for 
existing shareholders who would sacrifice a percentage of control. 
In practice, large Japanese corporations use what Professor Marleen 
O’Connor refers to as a Neutral Referee Model.144 Corporate boards 
consider the competing interests of shareholders and employees.145  
Long-term stability and profitability may require that employee interests 
trump short-term wealth maximization gains.146 The challenge of adopting 
such a system in the United States would be to define a clear test for 
balancing interests. 
China is also an interesting example. Large Chinese corporations 
have been growing so fast that there is tremendous demand for shares.147 
Limits on foreign ownership have magnified this phenomenon.148  
As a practical matter, shareholders in Chinese corporations have few 
mechanisms for holding management accountable for maximizing 
returns.149 Managers tend to be beholden to government interests  
which value factors such as the needs of local industry, export volume, and 
full employment.150 As the Chinese economy continues to expand,  
its model for governance is likely to play a more significant role 
internationally. So, both theory and competing practice provide potential 
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alternatives to shareholder exclusivity, especially with regard to concern 
for employee interests. 
There is a growing body of research contending that considering the 
interests of non-shareholder stakeholders positively contributes to  
long-term returns and may not ultimately conflict with shareholder 
interests.151 The movement by most states to allow consideration of 
interests other than short-term wealth maximization gives directors and 
managers flexibility to address the impact of their decisions on the various 
factors that make passive capital investment feasible.152 
V. CORPORATE CONVERSION AND THE LIMITS OF LAW 
Although legal scholars tend to spend a tremendous amount of time, 
thought, and effort proposing legal reform with an aim to effect social 
change, I remain skeptical that such reform alone is capable of 
transforming the essence of an institution. Law can create incentives, but 
incentives do not necessarily result in behavioral change. As of July 2020, 
twenty-two states and the District of Columbia had some sort of 
requirement to wear a facemask in public in the attempt to limit the spread 
of coronavirus.153 However, large segments of the populace emphatically 
refused to comply.154 In some cases, law enforcement officials publicly 
opposed such regulations and refused to enforce them.155 This section will 
consider the limits of rules imposed from above and the need for internal 
change from below. It will then consider examples of internal corporate 
change from below, in some cases in tension with legal rules. Finally, it 
will describe an example of corporate corruption as a contrast. 
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A. Limitations on Law in Changing the Essence of a Corporation 
Considering the spirit of the corporation may provide helpful insights 
into the limits of legal reform in changing behavior. Both the sociological 
and theological conceptions of spirit described earlier understand it as 
formed both by the individual human persons whose decisions direct the 
institution and the framework of institutions that support and constrain it. 
Law is one of those institutions, but, as mentioned earlier, it is not the only 
one. A change in legal rules may modify incentives for those who own or 
manage corporations, but the habits and patterns of decision-making and 
bureaucratic processes create a somewhat rigid framework that limits the 
range of acceptable decisions. For example, a primary motivator for 
corporate owners and managers is the accumulation of wealth. However, 
those interests are not naturally aligned when owners are not also 
managers. This creates a spectrum of alignment from the single 
owner/manager (sole proprietor model) business to the public company 
with professional outside management. Moving away from the sole 
proprietor model creates the agency problem which occupies so much of 
traditional corporate legal scholarship.156 Fiduciary duties, as well as much 
of securities regulation, are intended to hold management accountable, 
addressing the agency problem. The combination of multiple competing 
interest groups and internal mechanisms that perpetuate legacy policy 
commitments almost certainly limit the impact of isolated or atomized 
legal reforms. 
Wink’s consideration of spirit addresses the reinforcing structures 
that perpetuate violence in human institutions.157 Were he to describe the 
typical spirit of corporations, he would likely focus on greed, the priority 
of financial gain by owners and managers, and the legal and social 
structures like shareholder primacy that reinforce prioritization  
of financial gain over other goods. His response to the “Powers”  
(his term for the collected structures he identifies as dominating human 
persons) is as follows: 
One does not become free from the Powers by defeating them in 
a frontal attack . . . [W]e are liberated not by striking back at what 
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enslaved us . . . but by a willingness to die rather than submit to 
its command. . . . We are dead insofar as we have been socialized 
into patterns of injustice. We died, bit by bit, as expectations 
foreign to our essence were forced upon us. We died as we began 
to become complicit in our own alienation and that of 
others. . . . Each of us has already lost what would have been our 
way, had we only known how to find it . . . [A]t some point we 
must begin to become ourselves. And to do that, we who are dead 
must die to our learned preferences for domination.”158 
This death to self might be understood as the sacrifice of self-interest 
in the context of greed and the imperative to amass wealth. From an 
explicitly Christian perspective, Wink recommends the following: 
Do not continue to acquiesce in your oppression by the Powers; 
but do not react violently to it either. Rather, find a third way, a 
way that is neither submission nor assault, flight nor fight, a way 
that can secure your human dignity and begin to change the power 
equation. . . . Turn your cheek, thus indicating to the one who 
backhands you that his attempts to shame you into servility have 
failed. Strip naked and parade out of court, thus taking the 
momentum of the law and the whole debt economy and flipping 
them, jujitsulike [sic], in a burlesque of legality. Walk a second 
mile, surprising the occupation troops by placing them in jeopardy 
with their superiors. In short take the law and push it to the point 
of absurdity. These are, of course, not rules to be followed 
legalistically, but examples to spark an infinite variety of creative 
responses in new and changing circumstances. They break the 
cycle of humiliation with humor and even ridicule, exposing the 
injustice of the system. They recover for the poor a modicum of 
initiative that can force the oppressor to see them in a new light.159 
The reorientation of the essence of an institutional structure is thus 
dependent upon the human persons who contribute to the enterprise. From 
a theological point of view, it may be considered a form of conversion, a 
fundamental change of heart or viewpoint. Corporations are constituted by 
all stakeholders to some degree (regardless of the requirements of 
fiduciary duties), so it might be that the threshold conversion occurs in a 
variety of places. 
B. Corporate Conversion as Change from Below 
In an effort to restrain corporate excess and externalities, a number 
of movements have attempted to provide frameworks for evaluating the 
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relative “good” or “evil” of corporations. Perhaps the most notable are 
corporate social responsibility and the benefit corporation. Under these 
frameworks, a number of different groups evaluate, grade, and  
rank corporations according to their commitment and effectiveness in 
terms of corporate social responsibility.160 Although many jurisdictions 
have some version of a benefit corporation that explicitly allows business 
entities to serve defined public good, B Lab has come to serve as a 
gatekeeper by certifying “B Corps” using criteria beyond those allowed or 
required by state law.161 
Many businesses are lauded as good corporate citizens. Some of 
those businesses were founded with an intention to serve some aspect of 
the public good.162 Others shifted focus as a result of changed values of 
corporate leaders.163 This is most often attributed to chief executive 
officer, but senior management teams, boards of directors, shareholder 
activists, and labor leaders may all play a role. 
1. CEOs 
Perhaps the most obvious critical person in orienting a corporation 
toward the good is the chief executive officer. Although they are 
accountable to boards of directors, CEOs have broad authority to make 
decisions with potentially massive impacts on stakeholders. Thus, it is not 
surprising that a CEO’s personal transformations or epiphanies may shape 
the essence of the corporation. I note Ray Anderson, Jim Sinegal, Howard 
Schultz, and Bill Gates as examples below. 
a. Ray Anderson at Interface 
Ray Anderson, founder of Interface and green business pioneer, 
revolutionized the way modern day corporations view sustainability. 
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Anderson’s commitment to sustainability began when he had what he 
called “the spear in the chest epiphany” after reading The Ecology of 
Commerce.164 Anderson believed that the only way the Earth can change 
is if business, the most pervasive and influential force on the planet, is 
willing to lead.165 In the same year as this epiphany, Anderson declared 
that his company, Interface, was “committed to becoming the world’s first 
environmentally sustainable . . . and . . . restorative company.”166 
Perhaps more than any other corporate leader, Anderson makes a 
direct connection between spirit and the corporation. He identifies his 
epiphany regarding corporate responsibility to protect the environment as 
a kind of conversion, analogous to his own experience of Christian 
conversion.167 Anderson’s reorientation toward the common good was not 
a result of a purely internal process. It was employees of Interface who 
confronted him with the ecological problems created as a result of the 
company’s productions.168 In 1994, he was asked what his company was 
doing for the environment and whether he had an ecological “vision.”169 
He could not give an answer, and this deeply disturbed him.170  
He educated himself and began to wrestle with the challenge of  
economic and environmental sustainability in an industry (floorcoverings) 
reliant on petrochemicals.171 
His newfound commitment to sustainability prompted a number of 
internal reviews of manufacturing processes and company policies in an 
effort to minimize the environmental impact of the corporation.172 
Anderson supported a formal process to review the environmental 
sustainability of Interface.173 By 1997, he was able to articulate an 
ecological vision for Interface: 
If we’re successful, we’ll spend the rest of our days harvesting 
yester-year’s carpets and other petrochemically derived products, 
and recycling them into new materials; and converting sunlight 
into energy; with zero scrap going to the landfill and zero 
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emissions into the ecosystem. And we’ll be doing well . . . very 
well . . . by doing good. That’s the vision.174 
Anderson passed away in 2011, but under his leadership the company 
had begun to address some of its most problematic impacts. 
[T]he company had made significant progress towards that vision, 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 35 percent, fossil fuel 
consumption by 60 percent (favoring renewable forms of energy), 
waste to landfill by 82 percent, and water use by 82 percent and 
Interface had avoided over $450 million in costs, increased sales 
by 63 percent and more than doubled earnings.175 
Arguably, there are few businesses that are truly environmentally 
neutral, but Interface had a clear impact on the corporate culture of related 
chemical industries, by shining light on its own need for reform. Anderson 
has been lauded as a key corporate leader in challenging unquestioning 
shareholder exclusivity at the expense of the environment and the 
community.176 Something fundamental changed in the way Interface was 
managed, and it had concrete, definable impacts. It resulted in the sort of 
change in orientation of corporate “spirit” described by Wink and others. 
Ray C. Anderson is the central character in that dynamic, but it would 
be a mistake to identify a founder, CEO, or chairperson with the corporate 
entity entirely. Anderson was in dialogue with people under him in the 
corporate hierarchy and above him in the regulatory framework.177 His 
convictions were challenged and shaped by both, resulting in a paradigm 
shift. Then as the primary agent of the corporation, he did have a profound 
impact on its orientation toward environmental impact and sustainability. 
The shift was not immediate and required buy-in from the board, 
shareholders, employees, suppliers, and distributors.178 Eventually, the 
operations of the network of parties providing inputs to the business had 
fundamentally changed. Anderson would describe the change in 
commitment from maximizing profits to one of optimizing profit with 
minimized externalities for the benefit of the community, or truly 
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sustainable profits.179 He spoke about his own epiphany, but the impact on 
the “spirit” of Interface might be understood as a kind of conversion—a 
transformation that impacted market competitors and government. 
b. Jim Sinegal at Costco 
Jim Sinegal, co-founder and former CEO of Costco Wholesale 
Corporation, became a retail legend for his genuine care for customers and 
employees. Part of Sinegal’s success is attributed to his egalitarian 
business philosophy and belief that culture drives everything in a 
successful business.180 Sinegal believed that “if you find good people, give 
them good jobs, and pay them good wages, good things will happen.”181 
This belief differentiated Sinegal from other CEOs in the retail industry 
and is what transformed Costco into the international multi-billion dollar 
retail giant it is today.182 
Sinegal was mentored by Sol Price, founder of FedMart and Price 
Club (which later merged with Costco), who is often referred to as the 
father of the warehouse club.183 Sinegal worked his way up the ladder at 
FedMart before founding Costco in 1983, but he credited Price for shaping 
his approach to corporate management.184 Price’s hierarchy of duties at 
FedMart and Price Club persisted in the merged PriceCostco, and 
ultimately in Costco run by Jim Sinegal: “Our first duty is to our 
customers. Our second duty is to our employees. Our third duty is to our 
stockholders.”185 This approach challenges the role of shareholder 
exclusivity, particularly with regard to short-term returns. Even so, these 
values are deeply embedded in the corporate culture and spirit of Costco. 
That commitment has not been without cost. Costco has long been 
criticized for its commitment to members and employees. A number of 
shareholder proposals have challenged the board’s commitment to  
long-term sustainable growth by valuing members and employees. “On 
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Wall Street, they’re in the business of making money between now and 
next Thursday. . . . We want to build a company that will still be here 
50 . . . years from now.”186 
This focus on long-term sustained profits was used by Sinegal  
to justify the company’s emphasis on member satisfaction and employee 
wellbeing and retention. It is a core value of the business that has  
survived repeated scrutiny and reflects an important aspect of the core 
essence of Costco. 
Challenges to the board continued even after Sinegal retired. For 
example, in 2020, a shareholder proposal for a so-called “True Diversity 
Board Policy” requiring “ideological” diversity was included in proxy 
materials and opposed by the board.187 These policies were put forward at 
a number of corporations that have been committed to board diversity and 
long-term sustainability in an effort to challenge boards and management 
teams that have been associated with “liberal” perspectives or causes.188 
Unlike Interface, which experienced transformation in its values, 
Costco has been fairly consistent in its commitment to these core values 
that challenge some conceptions of shareholder primacy. That spirit was 
fostered by the founders and has been embraced and nurtured by 
employees and later boards. 
c. Howard Schultz at Starbucks 
Howard Schultz, former CEO of Starbucks Coffee Company, turned 
the regional coffee company into one of the world’s top brands.189 Schultz 
used his expertise in sustainable growth to expand Starbucks from eleven 
stores to more than thirty thousand stores worldwide.190 From the time 
Schultz became CEO until 2011, “Starbucks averaged two new store 
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openings each and every day.”191 Starbucks’s growth was sparked by 
Schultz’s vision of providing a coffeehouse experience—providing “an 
oasis for busy people in the midst of [their] hectic and fragmented lives.”192 
This unique experience is symbolic of Starbucks and is why the company 
continues to steadily grow and mature. 
Schultz has written about how his background and upbringing shaped 
his approach to corporate management.193 He has also on occasion noted 
the importance of his Jewish faith in his professional values. In a 2011 
essay, Schultz recounts a Holocaust story from the late Rabbi Nosson Tzvi 
Finkel that impacted him deeply: 
As they went into the area to sleep, only one person was given a 
blanket for every six. The person who received the blanket, when 
he went to bed, had to decide, “Am I going to push the blanket to 
the five other people who did not get one, or am I going to pull it 
toward myself to stay warm?” 
And Rabbi Finkel says, “It was during this defining moment that 
we learned the power of the human spirit, because we pushed the 
blanket to five others.” 
And with that, he stood up and said, “Take your blanket. Take it 
back to America and push it to five other people.”194 
Schultz internalized this as a communitarian value he attempted to 
incorporate in principle at Starbucks. The company’s commitment to fair 
trade sourcing, living wages, employee healthcare, education, and 
community advancement all fit within the general ambit of corporate 
social responsibility, and those policies developed in tandem with the CSR 
movement as it developed in the 1990s and 2000s.195 While such policies 
serve legitimate business purposes in terms of good will, reputation, and 
brand identification, they are sometimes discounted by critics as 
superficial window dressing;196 it is notable that many public  
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companies do not make similar commitments while Starbucks has been 
reasonably consistent over the years in making these values part of its 
corporate culture. 
The experience of Starbucks differs from that of Interface and 
Costco. The company began as a single coffee shop in Seattle’s Pike Place 
Market. It was run as a typical small business until its rapid expansion. 
Schultz was faced with the challenge of running a large, international 
public company subject to the scrutiny of analysts and regulators. His 
commitment to farmers, employees, and communities was rooted in his 
personal convictions and a broader Seattle culture of social responsibility 
that he helped to shape. 
d. Bill Gates at Microsoft 
Bill Gates, best known as the co-founder of the Microsoft 
Corporation, is the epitome of capitalist success. When Gates and Paul 
Allen started Microsoft, they had a farfetched vision of having a computer 
on every desktop and in every home.197 Today, this vision has become “a 
reality in many parts of the world.”198 Aside from Gates’s success with 
Microsoft, Gates and his wife, Melinda, founded the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation, “the world’s largest private charitable foundation.”199 Gates’s 
commitment to donating and giving back is what makes him a business 
magnate many aspire to be. 
Gates served as the CEO of Microsoft until 2006, Chairman of the 
Board until 2014, and a board member until 2020.200 At each stage, he 
indicated that these transitions were to allow him more time to concentrate 
on his philanthropy.201 He created the William H. Gates Foundation in 
1994 and then in 2000 consolidated his foundations with a five billion 
dollar grant to the new Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, which would 
become the largest charitable foundation in the world.202 The foundation 
is committed to global health, education, and economic sustainability.203 
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Almost the entirety of the Gates’s fortune (primarily consisting of 
Microsoft stock) will eventually be distributed through the foundation to 
further these goals.204 
Although Bill Gates has never described the sort of epiphany or 
conversion as Ray Anderson recounts, there appears to be a transition in 
his views towards Microsoft, wealth, and spirituality. Accounts of the 
early years of Microsoft tend to cast Gates as aggressive, self-interested, 
and single-mindedly focused on expansion and profit, not unlike the next 
generation of tech entrepreneurs, such as Mark Zuckerberg.205 He made 
disparaging comments regarding religion that garnered him a place on the 
list of “27 Celebrities You Probably Didn’t Know Are Atheists.”206 
However, there appears to be an evolution in his views and commitments 
at least traceable from the time of his marriage to Melinda (French) Gates 
in 1994, the same year he created his first foundation. Melinda Gates is a 
practicing Catholic, and the couple raised their children attending a local 
Catholic church.207 This was also a time of incredible growth for 
Microsoft. Its corporate culture had been described as cutthroat with 
regard to its treatment of both employees and competitors.208 However, as 
the firm grew, there was an increasing awareness that the long-term 
sustainability of the firm might require commitments to employees and the 
local community (Redmond and the greater Seattle region, in 
particular).209 Eventually, at the direction of Gates, Microsoft would come 
to be viewed as a leader in corporate social responsibility. After the tech 
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bubble of 2000, the stock price leveled off.210 The firm repositioned itself 
as a traditional blue chip holding rather than as a technology growth stock. 
The Gates Foundation ramped up its research and distribution capacity in 
the early 2000s, and in 2000, Gates stepped down as CEO in order to focus 
on that charitable work.211 This personal journey had an impact on the 
culture and essence of Microsoft, making the transition from brash 
expansionist to responsible corporate citizenship. The company certainly 
still has its detractors, but it is often noted as an example of what large 
technology firms can, and perhaps ought to be, when compared with 
similar firms (Amazon and Facebook, in particular).212 
In an illuminating Rolling Stone interview in 2014, Gates appeared 
to shift from his earlier statements disparaging religion by noting that it is 
an important source of morality: 
The moral systems of religion, I think, are super 
important. . . . We’ve raised our kids in a religious way; they’ve 
gone to the Catholic church that Melinda goes to and I participate 
in. . . . I think it makes sense to believe in God, but exactly  
what decision in your life you make differently because of it, I 
don’t know.213 
Many business leaders have impacted the culture and essence of 
Microsoft, but the personal journey of Bill Gates toward social 
responsibility undoubtedly impacted the character of the corporation. 
2. Leadership Teams 
The previous section describes the impact of notable CEOs in 
establishing or transforming corporate culture. However, in some cases 
senior managers set standards for good corporate behavior without a single 
dominating leader. These stories are potentially more complex, but I 
quickly note five companies that consistently rank very highly in  
corporate responsibility and sustainability rankings as a result of the 
commitment of senior managers. Some of these firms have played a 
significant role in reimagining the scope of corporate fiduciary duties and 
the B Corp movement. 
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a. Ben & Jerry’s 
Most famous for their iconic pop culture-inspired ice cream flavors, 
Ben & Jerry’s ice cream empire started from humble beginnings. Founders 
Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield opened their first “ice cream shop in a 
converted gas station in Vermont” in 1978.214 Ben & Jerry’s quickly 
exploded in popularity and became one of the most popular ice cream 
brands. In addition to the company’s financial success, Ben & Jerry’s 
became one of the first companies in the world to give a social mission 
equal importance with its economic goals.215 Ben & Jerry’s has a three-
part mission: (1) their economic mission is “to manage [their] Company 
for sustainable financial growth,” (2) their social mission “compels [them] 
to use [their] Company in innovative ways to make the world a better 
place,” and (3) their product mission “drives [them] to make fantastic ice 
cream” products.216 
The alternative, liberal, and countercultural approach to corporate 
governance established by the founders and management team proved to 
be deeply enduring. In 2000, the company was sold to Unilever in a 
somewhat controversial move that pitted an obligation to accept an 
unsolicited offer that objectively appeared to be in the financial interest of 
shareholders over the values of the firm.217 However, the unique character 
of the company has persisted. Ben & Jerry’s is now a certified B Corp and 
continues to support some of the values held by the previous management 
team, even though it is owned by a large multinational conglomerate that 
does not always share those values.218 This may serve as an example of 
corporate essence ultimately taking on an existence separate from 
founders, managers, and parent companies. 
b. Natura 
When it comes to social responsibility in business, an obvious 
exemplar would be Natura. The Brazillian cosmetics company “has built 
a reputation for treating the environment, suppliers[,] and customers 
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responsibly.”219 Natura commits to sustainability by reducing waste, 
controlling raw material consumption, using environmentally friendly 
packaging, and working with other like-minded environment focused 
companies.220 Additionally, unlike many of its competitors, Natura has 
met its carbon-zero goal since 2007 by funding projects aimed at 
sequestrating carbon emissions.221 
Although Antonio Luiz Seabra started the business as a single 
sundries shop in São Paolo in 1969,222 Natura has grown into a 
multinational conglomerate including the Body Shop, Aesop, and Avon.223 
Sustainability and social responsibility have been core commitments of the 
management team, particularly over the past three decades.224 Seabra hired 
strategically to ensure that these values would continue to be embraced by 
managers and remain at the core of the corporation’s identity even as the 
firm has grown. 
c. Patagonia 
Patagonia, the well-known and respected American clothing 
company, leads by example in taking action against the most pressing 
environmental issues facing our world.225 Since 1985, Patagonia has 
awarded over $89 million to the preservation and restoration of the natural 
environment through its commitment of either 1% of sales or 10% of 
profits, whichever is greater, to various international grassroots 
environmental groups.226 Aside from environmental activism, Patagonia’s 
nearly two thousand employees are paid market or higher wages  
and receive excellent benefits, including generous health care,  
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subsidized child care, flexible work schedules, and paid time off for 
environmental internships.227 
Patagonia’s environmental focus can be attributed to its founder, 
Yvon Chouinard, but this value, along with a broader commitment to 
corporate responsibility, is shared by the executive team of the 
company.228 The company is now a B Corp and is consistently cited as a 
model of corporate sustainability and culture.229 
d. TOMS Shoes 
“For every pair of shoes purchased, one pair is donated to a rural 
neighborhood in a developing country.”230 For the past fourteen years, 
TOMS has held to its buy one, give one promise. TOMS’s commitment to 
equity is commendable and changes to adapt. As of April 1, 2020, TOMS 
began to direct one-third of its net profits to the TOMS COVID-19 Global 
Giving Fund.231 TOMS explicitly commits to promoting the common good 
with each sale.232 
Founded by Blake Mycoskie and Alejo Nitti in 2006, TOMS Shoes, 
LLC was taken over by creditors in 2019.233 However, the transition has 
not changed the focus on charity, equity, and development at this certified 
B Corp. Some continuity in the management team and buy-in on the part 
of the new owners has allowed the company to maintain its identity even 
as it faces financial challenges.234 Although the company continues to 
struggle (as do nearly all retail businesses in 2020), the persistence of its 
character and essence speaks to an identity separate from the founders and 
even particular managers. 
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e. Warby Parker 
Warby Parker’s “Buy a Pair, Give a Pair” program is an example of 
the company’s strong commitment to helping and giving back to those in 
need.235 The program is simple, yet effective: “for every pair of Warby 
Parker glasses purchased, a pair of glasses is distributed to someone in 
need.”236 With this program and others related to the promotion of equity 
and the common good, Warby Parker commits to making a difference and 
lasting impact. In some ways the apparently eleemosynary approach to 
marketing is similar to that of TOMS Shoes. 
Warby Parker was founded in 2010 by Jeffrey Raider, Andrew Hunt, 
Neil Blumenthal, and David Gilboa with support from the Wharton 
Venture Initiation Program.237 By 2015 it was valued at $1.2 billion and 
was established as a B Corp.238 It is an example of a successful  
company formed by a new generation of social entrepreneurs. The four 
ground rules at the core of Warby Parker’s corporate culture are the 
following: “[t]reat customers the way we’d like to be treated”; “[c]reate an 
environment where employees can think big, have fun, and do good”; 
“[g]et out there”; and “[g]reen is good.”239 The founding management 
team built these values into the structure of the company and they have 
hired and trained new employees with these priorities. As a newer stage 
company than those already mentioned, Warby Parker could serve as an 
interesting subject for empirical research related to the durability of its 
corporate culture and values. 
3. Shareholder Activists 
Pressure to further the common good does not come only from 
CEOs, founders, boards, and management teams; shareholders can also 
play an important and constructive role. Some shareholder activism 
advocates various approaches to shareholder primacy, but many 
shareholder proposals address environmental or social concerns.240  
Such efforts are occasionally approved, but even when they are rejected 
by boards or shareholders, proposals included in proxy materials  
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shine light on important issues (which is often a primary objective of 
shareholder activists). 
In my experience, some of the most effective shareholder advocacy 
has involved appeals to management teams that do not result in a formal 
proposal for a shareholder vote. Corporate leaders are sometimes 
sympathetic to issues raised by shareholders who attempt to further equity 
or sustainability goals in a nonadversarial context.241 
a. South African Divestment 
Throughout the 1980s, many United States shareholders took part in 
corporate protest that involved corporate divestment by investors who 
wanted to express disfavor with apartheid and American corporate 
complicity in it.242 A number of colleges and universities, including 
Columbia, Amherst, Smith, Wisconsin, and Tufts divested themselves of 
some or all of their holdings in firms that did business in South Africa.243 
Despite the large effort by many shareholder activists, many American 
corporations doing business in South Africa questioned whether joining 
the divestment protests was worth sacrificing profitable operations.244 
South African leaders, including Nelson Mandela, asserted that the 
divestment movement was critical in weakening apartheid and created a 
necessary condition for the new constitution.245 
b. Contemporary Divestment: Fossil Fuel, Sudan, etc. 
Divestment from fossil fuel companies has been a controversial topic 
in recent years. Many institutional investors express their unease at fossil 
fuel divestment, mainly because of the potential financial injury that could 
arise from a less diversified portfolio.246 “On the other hand, proponents 
argue that complying with fiduciary duty requires divestment. . . .”247 The 
burning of fossil fuels are a major cause of climate change that may require 
immediate attention and action by corporate leaders.248 However, it 
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remains to be seen whether this divestment will become as impactful a 
strategy as it was in South Africa. 
c. Environmental Activism 
Many of the United States corporate business leaders recognize the 
urgency of environmental issues such as climate change. Despite their 
concern, there was a common belief amongst corporate leaders “that 
pursuing a sustainability agenda runs counter to the wishes of their 
shareholders.”249 Thankfully, this perception is outdated. In a recent study, 
seventy senior executives at forty-three institutional investing firms almost 
universally voted that environmental, social, and governance issues were 
“top of mind” for them.250 The implementation of sustainable thinking in 
a corporate context is a necessary environmental focus that many 
institutional investors are realizing is critically important.251 
d. Socially Conscious Investment 
Over the past ten years, there has been a massive increase in funds 
being allocated and invested in businesses contributing to efforts 
emphasizing sustainability and other social issues.252 During the first 
quarter of 2019, record funds were invested in businesses prioritizing 
environmental, social, and governance issues.253 Dirk Schoenmaker, 
professor at Erasmus University Rotterdam, wrote an essay providing a 
framework for sustainable finance.254 He describes “Sustainable Finance 
3.0” as a transition from risk to opportunity where financial institutions 
invest only in sustainable companies and projects.255 Within this model, 
investors evaluate investment opportunities “based on their potential  
to generate positive social and environmental impacts.”256 If more 
companies and corporate leaders adopt this sort of model, we would expect 
to observe a rise in funds being allocated to businesses contributing to the 
common good. 
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4. Labor Pressure 
Labor law provides some formalized procedures via unions, but most 
employees in the United States are not represented by a union.257 As a 
result, employees in most businesses have relatively little power to effect 
change and impact corporate policies. However, that has not prevented 
nonunion employees from organizing sickouts and other forms of work 
stoppage in opposition to corporate policies addressing a range of 
issues.258 One traditional solution to solving the tension between employee 
and shareholder interests has been to align those roles. I will briefly note 
the employee buyout of United Airlines as an example of change from 
below and the acquisition process of the Mondragon Corporation as an 
example of change from above. 
a. Union Equity Participation in United Airlines 
As a solution to ongoing labor strife and financial challenges, United 
Airlines in 1994 enacted an Employee Stock Ownership Program that gave 
a controlling interest in the corporation to employees.259 This was hailed 
as a new model by some and may be an example of a positive change in 
the culture or spirit of a corporation as a result of employee influence.260 
However, as a result of eroding relationships with its unions and the 
challenges to the travel sector created by 9/11, United filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy in 2002, ending the dream of employee ownership.261 
Although some argue that this failure demonstrated a fundamental flaw in 
employee ownership, others contend that the implemented structure was 
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the problem rather than the principle of employee ownership per se.262 
Despite this high-profile failure, approximately 7,000 United States 
corporations have Employee Stock Option Plans holding a  
majority of their respective corporate shares, and about 2,000 firms are 
entirely owned by employees.263 
b. Mondragon’s Application of Cooperative Principles in Acquisitions 
The Mondragon Corporation, a large multinational business 
headquartered in Spain employing about 75,000 people,264 is structured as 
an employee owned cooperative with strict rules regarding governance and 
compensation intended to include and benefit employees.265 Mondragon 
has faced numerous financial and policy challenges, and some of its 
cooperative subsidiaries have failed.266 However, it remains an example of 
employee ownership that has proven to be durable over time as well as 
scalable.267 One of the most interesting impacts of its expansion has been 
the extension of employee ownership to subsidiaries that are purchased by 
the Mondragon Corporation.268 This is an ironic mirror image of the hard-
won employee buyout of United in that managers of the target grant broad 
ownership rights and protections to employees that they never had to 
bargain for.269 This is a model for an ostensibly positive change in 
corporate culture and values largely imposed by a parent company. 
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C. A Counter Example: Bad Corporate Spirit 
Although the previous section focused on corporations that 
emphasize various aspects of the common good, there are many examples 
of bad corporate actors recounted in business and legal scholarship. With 
regard to the nature of a corporate spirit, if there are businesses whose 
essences are positive and encourage flourishing, we would expect a similar 
negative impact from a corporation whose essence has been “corrupted.” 
Amazon, Facebook, and Google have all been criticized for  
anti-competitive and arguably exploitive market behavior,270 and perhaps 
they will eventually serve as case studies for the fallen spirit of a 
corporation; however, I will briefly describe the failure of Enron as a 
model for the corruption of corporate spirit. 
A trove of excellent scholarship has detailed the rise and fall of Enron 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s.271 I read the wildly popular The Smartest 
Guys in the Room by Bethany McLean when it was published in 2003 
while I was doing research related to the trial of former CEOs Jeffrey 
Skilling and Ken Lay.272 A powerful documentary based on the book was 
released in 2005, and I have assigned it to my business entities students 
ever since as a case study in creeping corporate corruption. Even fifteen 
years later, the issues remain relevant to considering the regulation and 
management of public companies. 
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Enron began as a successful natural gas distribution company, 
founded and led by Ken Lay, who was a pillar of Houston society and an 
avowedly religious man.273 Although he was never sentenced because of 
his untimely death, he was found guilty in the criminal trial against both 
him and Jeffrey Skilling.274 Even so, some of the most egregious acts were 
never linked to Lay.275 One narrative floated at the time was that Lay had 
been a man of integrity and that any truly inappropriate acts had been 
perpetrated by others, namely Skilling and the CFO, Andy Fastow.276 
However, there is evidence that Lay was aware of malfeasance related to 
Enron Oil’s office in Valhalla, New York, in 1987 and did nothing to 
reprimand or prevent similar occurrences, ostensibly because they were 
profitable for the corporation.277 
The most obvious crimes and violations of fiduciary duties were 
perpetrated by Andy Fastow (self-dealing, accounting fraud, and so much 
more).278 Fastow was convicted in a plea that required him to cooperate in 
the investigation of Skilling (who as CEO had hired him) and Lay (who 
returned to the role of CEO after Skilling’s departure).279 According to 
testimony from the trial, Skilling was aware that Fastow was willing to 
bend rules in order to benefit himself and the company.280 Skilling fostered 
an aggressive corporate culture with explicit Darwinian and 
hypermasculine overtones—his so-called “guys with spikes.”281 One of his 
highest priorities was obtaining SEC permission to use mark-to-market 
accounting to book profits immediately for contract obligations in the 
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future.282 This was a reasonable proposal when applied to futures contracts 
for oil and gas delivery (the early core business of Enron), but it made little 
sense when applied to massive speculative project finance infrastructure 
projects in places like India or Nigeria that were becoming the flagship 
business of the company.283 I was involved in a number of project finance 
deals in the Middle East in the mid to late 1990s in which Enron submitted 
astonishingly low bids; only when the company imploded did I understand 
that those bids were likely never economically viable. 
Institutionally, Enron was founded and originally run by a well-
respected businessperson (Lay) who had a reputation for integrity but who 
also demonstrated a willingness to turn a blind eye for gain. He brought 
on Skilling as an aggressive leader to push boundaries and grow the 
company. Skilling certainly knew that some of his policies skirted legality, 
and he hired Fastow to implement the most egregious.284 Ultimately, the 
massive losses could no longer be hidden, and the company crashed in the 
largest bankruptcy up to that time. Studying the company over the past 
twenty years, the documented creeping corruption has reminded me of the 
description of temptation and corruption fictionally recounted in C.S. 
Lewis’ The Screwtape Letters.285 In the preface, Lewis describes the 
context for the book: 
I live in the Managerial Age, in a world of “Admin.” The greatest 
evil is not now done in those sordid “dens of crime” that Dickens 
loved to paint. It is not done even in concentration camps and 
labour camps. In those we see its final result. But it is conceived 
and ordered (moved, seconded, carried, and minuted) in clean, 
carpeted, warmed and well-lighted offices, by quiet men with 
white collars and cut fingernails and smooth-shaven cheeks who 
do not need to raise their voices. Hence, naturally enough, my 
symbol for Hell is something like the bureaucracy of a police state 
or the office of a thoroughly nasty business concern.286 
The advice of the main character, Screwtape, as a devil and temptor 
is that “the safest road to Hell is the gradual one—the gentle slope, soft 
underfoot, without sudden turnings, without milestones, without 
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signposts[.]”287 A relatively small failure on the part of an otherwise 
virtuous leader left open the possibility of hiring more compromised 
leaders and a transformation of the culture, character, and essence of 
Enron, which ultimately led to its own destruction along with massive 
collateral damage to thousands of employees and entire communities. 
CONCLUSION 
There are strong theological arguments from a variety of traditions 
attributing a spiritual character to human institutions if not an individual 
spirit. A purely secular approach could conclude that such institutions have 
identifiable characteristics and cultures which, though created by human 
persons and other structures, take on an identity separate from those 
shaping them that may persist. I assert that both views may be identified 
as something we may understand as “spirit.” 
Spirits can be oriented more or less toward the common good and 
human flourishing or bare self-interest and domination. This orientation is 
shaped by the relationships the entity has with those who provide inputs 
(stakeholders) and those who create external incentives (markets and 
regulators). Changes to legal rules alone are unlikely to result in the 
transformation of corporate spirit. Enron may serve as an example of a 
corporation corrupted in its essence as a result of progressively more self-
interested and corrupt acts by managers combined with the willful 
blindness of regulators and observers. Some corporations have 
transformed as an apparent result of the epiphany of key managers (such 
as the case of Ray C. Anderson and Interface), but most of the corporations 
routinely identified as model citizens get to that place as a result of 
consistent or gradual commitments by investors, managers, and 
employees—sometimes supported by regulatory frameworks holding 
corporations to higher standards (such as the variety of benefit corporation 
entity options and certifications). Legal rules cannot prompt conversion in 
the hearts of corporate leaders, but they may be able to frame a paradigm 
that minimizes corruption and appropriately incentivizes pursuit of the 
common good as was imagined by Berle in Corporate Capitalism and 
“The City of God.”288 
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